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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






PATRICIA WHARWOOD; RICHARD CONCEPCION 
   
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK NA; FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY; MICHAEL 
RUSSELL, a/k/a John Doe 
 




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-16590) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2021 
 
Before: AMBRO, PORTER, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Patricia Wharwood appeals pro se from an order granting the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss her amended complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
In 2014, the New Jersey Superior Court entered judgment against Wharwood in 
foreclosure proceedings concerning a defaulted loan that was secured by her property in 
Lincoln Park, New Jersey.  From 2014 to 2019, Wharwood filed multiple motions 
challenging the judgment and seeking stays of a subsequent sheriff’s sale and her eviction 
from the foreclosed property.  All of these motions were denied.  
In 2019, Wharwood1 filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wells Fargo, 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), and Michael Russell.  Wharwood raised 
six claims challenging the foreclosure and subsequent sale of her home, including: 1) an 
action for “ejectment”; 2) an action regarding alleged trespass on Wharwood’s property; 
3) “breach of estate and statutory rights”; 4) the “wrongful use of civil proceedings” 5) an 
action to “revive the equity of redemption”; and 6) an action to “impose a constructive 
trust.”  The defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, including that the action 
 
1 Richard Concepcion was Wharwood’s tenant and was evicted from the property.  He 
was identified as a plaintiff in the lawsuit below but is not participating in the appeal, and 
Wharwood cannot represent his interests on appeal.  See Murray v. City of Phila., 901 
F.3d 169, 170 (3d Cir. 2018) (“an individual may represent herself or himself pro  




was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2  Wharwood responded with a short answer 
asserting that “defendant’s [m]otion is bogus, unworthy of response, evasive and inane.”  
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion, concluding that the complaint failed 
to state any viable claims, was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that the 
claims against the FHFA were barred by sovereign immunity.  The District Court gave 
Wharwood leave to amend her complaint. 
Wharwood then filed an amended complaint which was nearly identical to the 
original complaint.  The only substantive difference was the addition of one more claim, 
titled a “demand to recover the mortgage note.”  The defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the same grounds.  Wharwood did not respond, and the District Court 
dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.  Wharwood appealed.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
de novo review over the District Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of 
Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018); see Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments 
III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) (exercising de novo review over district 
 
2 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 




court’s invocation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).  We construe Wharwood’s pro se 
filings liberally.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 
III. 
In her brief on appeal, Wharwood focuses on her claim that she was improperly 
evicted under New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act and the federal Protecting Tenants at 
Foreclosure Act of 2009 (“PTFA”).3  The District Court determined that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the claims concerning the foreclosure, sale, and subsequent eviction 
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, alternatively, that the claims lacked merit. 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction over claims when “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 
‘complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were 
rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court 
to review and reject the state judgments.”  Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379, 
385 (3d Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  To the extent that Wharwood challenges the 
 
3 Accordingly, Wharwood has forfeited review of much of the District Court’s decision 
including, for example, the District Court’s determination that her claim against the 
FHFA was barred by sovereign immunity.  See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna 
Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that claims were forfeited 
where appellant failed to raise them in her opening brief); Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of 
Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that “we have 
consistently refused to consider ill-developed arguments” or those not properly preserved 




foreclosure action, we agree with the District Court that her challenge is barred by 
Rooker-Feldman from review in federal court.  See Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 
82, 104 (2d Cir. 2021) (foreclosure decision “is the type of claim that Rooker-Feldman 
squarely forecloses, both because it addresses an injury caused by the state court 
judgment, and because it would require the district court to review that judgment”).   
We question whether Wharwood’s claim concerning the eviction is similarly 
barred.4  However, the eviction claims are barred by New Jersey’s preclusion rules.  See 
In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 229–30 (3d Cir. 2008); Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W 
Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 885–86 (3d Cir. 1997).5  Under New Jersey law, which governs 
the inquiry, see McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1989), “when a 
controversy between parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer open to 
relitigation,” Adelman v. BSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 179 A.3d 431, 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
 
4 While Wharwood was ultimately evicted because of the state court foreclosure decision 
and had multiple motions to stay the eviction denied during that litigation, the direct 
injury caused by the state court’s judgment was the property’s foreclosure.  The state 
court is likely more accurately described as “having ‘acquiesced in’ or ‘ratified’” the 
eviction.  Vuyanich, 5 F.4th at 386.  This does not satisfy Prong 2.  Id.  In any event, we 
need not conclusively resolve these issues because preclusion principles are dispositive of 
Wharwood’s claims.  See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 
2016) (Court was “permitted to ‘bypass’ the jurisdictional inquiry in favor of a non-
merits dismissal on claim preclusion grounds”). 
5 We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, see Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. 
Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 469 (3d Cir. 2015), and Wells Fargo has raised the preclusion 
defense before both the District Court, and this Court.  Given Wharwood’s discussion of 
the foreclosure action in her complaint and on appeal, we conclude that it is appropriate 




Div. 2018) (quoting Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control for Paterson, 165 
A.2d 163, 167 (N.J. 1960)).  Res judicata applies if there is “(1) a final judgment by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of issues, (3) identity of parties, and (4) 
identity of the cause of action.”  Brookshire Equities, LLC v. Montaquiza, 787 A.2d 942, 
947 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  Here, Wharwood raised most of the same 
allegations in the foreclosure action—including her argument that the New Jersey Anti-
Eviction Act protected her from eviction—but the trial court rejected her claims, denying 
her motion that sought to stop the eviction based on the Anti-Eviction Act.  See Opinion, 
ECF No. 26, at *3.  Therefore, to the extent that Wharwood seeks to relitigate the same 
claims, they are barred by res judicata.   
Moreover, to the extent there is any difference between the claims or parties in the 
two actions, Wharwood’s claims are barred by New Jersey’s Entire Controversy 
Doctrine.  Under this doctrine, a party must bring in one action “‘all affirmative claims 
that [it] might have against another party, including counterclaims and cross-claims,’” 
and must join “‘all parties with a material interest in the controversy,’” or “be forever 
barred from bringing a subsequent action involving the same underlying facts.”  Rycoline 
Prods., Inc., 109 F.3d at 885–86 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).  This 
doctrine bars any variations of the claims concerning the allegedly improper foreclosure 
and eviction that Wharwood seeks to raise in this action. See Delacruz, 145 A.3d at 708 




right of [mortgagee] to foreclose had to be raised in the foreclosure proceeding or they 
were barred.”).6 
In addition, Wharwood has not established that further amendment would enable 
her to cure the defect in her amended complaint, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that allowing leave to amend is unnecessary if 
amendment would be futile). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
 
6 Wharwood also argued that her eviction violated the PTFA but she does not 
demonstrate how the act would apply to her where by its plain terms it applies only to 
bona fide tenants and Wharwood was the mortgagor of the property.  See Pub. L. No. 
111-22 § 702(b), 123 Stat. 1632 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5220 note).   
